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DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER THE ADEA:
APPLICANTS NEED NOT APPLY
L. Whitney Woodward∗
INTRODUCTION
Generally, American employment’s default rule is employment at
will, meaning that unless agreed upon otherwise, employers are free
to hire and fire who they wish for any reason or no reason, so long as
the employer’s reason is not illegal.1 Though this approach provides
benefits to both employers and employees,2 employer practices
before the mid-1960s often used this default position of employment
at will to unfairly discriminate against their employees for innate
characteristics, like race, gender, and age.3 To combat certain
discriminatory practices, Congress, in 1964, passed Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act (Title VII), which prohibits workplace
discrimination on the bases of race, color, sex, religion, and national
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Georgia State University College of Law. Thank you to Professors Kelly
Timmons and Megan Boyd for your guidance, encouragement, and constructive feedback during this
Note writing process. To Joe Akers and Loren Friedman, tremendous legal minds that I am fortunate
enough to work with each day, thank you for sharing your time and feedback with me during this
writing expedition. Additionally, thank you to my peers from the Georgia State University Law Review
for your time and energy in preparing this Note for publication. Finally, and most importantly, thank
you to my family, especially my husband, son, and daughter, for your unwavering support and belief in
me throughout this law school journey.
1. STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 7, 395 (LexisNexis
ed., 5th ed. 2012); see also The At-Will Presumption and Exceptions to the Rule, NAT’L ASS’N OF ST.
LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employment-overview.aspx
[https://perma.cc/HA3G-UGZE] (last visited Sept. 21, 2019) (“Thus far, Montana is the only state [in
the United States] to have completely eliminated the at-will rule.”).
2. Marilyn Lindblad, Advantages & Disadvantages of At-Will Employment, BIZFLUENT (Sept. 26,
2017), https://bizfluent.com/info-8533105-advantages-disadvantages-atwill-employment.html
[https://perma.cc/V6EJ-E5J5]; Catherine Lovering, Good Things About At-Will Employment, SMALL
BUS.-CHRON.,
https://smallbusiness.chron.com/good-things-atwill-employment-34594.html
[https://perma.cc/U4MA-UQTB] (last visited Sept. 24, 2019). Employment at will arrangements retain
the benefit of choice for both employees and employers—the choice to walk away from the employment
relationship if it is not working for either party. Lindblad, supra; Lovering, supra.
3. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L. REV. 380, 380–81 (1976)
(discussing Age Discrimination in Employment Act’s creation); Tamara Lytle, Title VII Changed the
Face of the American Workplace, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (May 21, 2014),
https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/pages/title-vii-changed-the-face-of-the-americanworkplace.aspx [https://perma.cc/4VWC-DYCZ].
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origin.4 Although its drafters contemplated prohibiting discrimination
against older workers, Title VII is silent regarding age.5 This missing
protection, however, was remedied in 1967 with the passage of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which stands
outside Title VII protections and prohibits age-based employment
discrimination.6
Under Title VII, both non-employee applicants and employees
alleging employment-based discrimination may bring suit under a
disparate treatment theory, a disparate impact theory, or both.7
Disparate treatment claims involve the employer’s intentional
discrimination based on a prohibited factor under the law.8 In
contrast, disparate impact claims involve employer practices that are
facially neutral but permit an individual to prove employment
discrimination based on the effect of an employment policy or
practice on a protected class, rather than the employer’s intent behind
it.9 Though many of Title VII’s interpretations were applied
analogously to discrimination claims under the ADEA, the disparate
impact theory was not explicitly recognized as applicable to
employees in the ADEA context until Smith v. City of Jackson.10
4. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/titlevii.cfm [https://perma.cc/4PFN-2J7H] (last visited Aug. 8,
2019). “[A]fter the longest debate in its nearly 180-year history, the U.S. Senate passes the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. The vote in favor of the bill is [seventy-three] to [twenty-seven]. Five hundred
amendments were made to the bill and Congress has debated the bill for 534 hours.” 1964, U.S. EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/milestones/1964.html
[https://perma.cc/VNP8-64XE] (last visited Sept. 24, 2019).
5. Smith v. City of Jackson, 554 U.S. 228, 232 (2005) (citing Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v.
Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 587 (2004)) (“During the deliberations that preceded the enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Congress considered and rejected proposed amendments that would have included
older workers among the classes protected from employment discrimination.”); see Jeremy J. Glenn &
Katelan E. Little, A Study of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 31 GPSOLO 40, 42
(2014).
6. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, supra note 3, at 381.
7. WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 1, at 395.
8. Employment Tests and Selection Procedures, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/factemployment_procedures.html
[https://perma.cc/W5YM-J3D2]
(last visited Sept. 24, 2019).
9. Id.
10. Smith, 554 U.S. at 233–34, 240. “[We] now hold that the ADEA does authorize recovery in
‘disparate[]impact’ cases comparable to Griggs. Because, however, we conclude that petitioners have
not set forth a valid disparate[]impact claim, we affirm.” Id. at 232. In Smith, although the Court agreed
that a disparate impact right existed under the ADEA, the petitioner-employees were not successful in
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However, Smith involved an employee’s ability to bring a claim of
disparate impact age discrimination and did not address whether the
theory of recovery was available to non-employee job applicants,
leaving the question open as to whether applicants for employment
have a cognizable claim under the ADEA’s disparate impact theory.11
Part I12 of this Note addresses the current debate on this topic,
illustrated through case law in the Eleventh Circuit,13 the Seventh
Circuit,14 and a recent federal district court ruling in the Ninth
Circuit.15 Part II analyzes the unambiguous, textual differences
between the various subsections of the ADEA as well as the textual
differences between Title VII and the ADEA.16 This Note explores
these textual arguments through an analysis of the statutes and
interpretative case law and concludes that, as drafted, the disparate
impact theory of age discrimination should not be available to nonemployee job applicants.17 Part III illustrates why utilizing a
disparate impact theory of recovery in age discrimination cases is
futile for non-employee job applicants, demonstrates why the current
position held18 by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), the administrative agency responsible for the ADEA’s
enforcement,19 should not be determinative on this matter,20 and
their claim of age-based discrimination because the employer had a “reasonable factor other than age”
for the employment action. Id. at 244.
11. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 806 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2015), rev’d en banc,
839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016).
12. See infra Part I.
13. See, e.g., Villarreal, 806 F.3d at 1288 (2015).
14. See, e.g., Kleber v. CareFusion Corp., 888 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2018), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 914
F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2019).
15. See, e.g., Rabin v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
16. See infra Part II.
17. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 969 (11th Cir. 2016).
18. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (2007); 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(c) (2012).
It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual in any aspect of
employment because that individual is [forty] years old or older, unless one of the
statutory exceptions applies. Favoring an older individual over a younger individual
because of age is not unlawful discrimination under the ADEA, even if the younger
individual is at least [forty] years old. However, the ADEA does not require
employers to prefer older individuals and does not affect applicable state, municipal,
or local laws that prohibit such preferences.
29 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (2007) (emphasis added).
19. About
EEOC,
U.S.
EQUAL
EMP.
OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/CD84-GNZF] (last visited Sept. 24, 2019). The
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proposes a new pathway to support older job applicants in their
quests for employment.21 This Note advocates for Congress, through
legislative action, and the EEOC, through its rulemaking
responsibilities, to develop incentives and education initiatives for
employers to eliminate the unconscious biases and stereotypes often
encumbering older workers.22
I. Background
Although the ADEA recognizes disparate treatment claims for
both employees and applicants,23 the ADEA’s recently recognized
disparate impact language, appearing in Title 29, § 623(a)(2) of the
United States Code, contains slightly different language.24 In Smith,
the Court first recognized the disparate impact theory for employees
under the ADEA but also noted that this theory is narrower under the
ADEA than it is under Title VII.25 Although Title VII explicitly
EEOC enforces employment discrimination laws provided under various federal laws like Title VII and
the ADEA. Id. One of the agency’s primary responsibilities is to investigate discrimination charges
raised by workers, make a finding, and either settle with or sue the employer in response to
discriminatory behavior. Id.
20. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 970.
Because “[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction,” we
must first “employ[] [the] traditional tools of statutory construction” to determine
whether the meaning of the statute is clear. Although employing the traditional tools
of statutory construction may require some effort, that effort does not make a text
ambiguous. We have employed the traditional tools of statutory interpretation here,
and we conclude that the only reasonable meaning of the statute is that a job applicant
cannot sue under [§] 4(a)(2).
Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)) (citing
Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1991)) (citations omitted).
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Part III.
23. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or refuse
to hire or discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age ”).
24. Id. § 623(a)(2) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s
age ”).
25. Smith v. City of Jackson, 554 U.S. 228, 240 (2005). Smith involved claims by age forty and
older employees, arguing that the city’s adopted pay plan, granting raises to all city employees, provided
a greater percentage of income raises to younger employees than older employees. Id. at 230. The pay
plan’s purpose was to “attract and retain qualified people, provide incentive for performance, maintain
competitiveness with other public sector agencies and ensure equitable compensation to all employees
regardless of age, sex, race and/or disability” and accomplished this purpose partly through bringing all
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recognizes that both employees and job applicants may raise
disparate impact claims,26 the question of whether non-employee job
applicants may raise disparate impact claims under the ADEA
remains unsettled.27 The following cases illustrate this timely
debate.28
A. The Eleventh Circuit: Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
In Villarreal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered
whether a non-employee job applicant could sue a potential employer
for age discrimination under the ADEA pursuant to a disparate
impact theory.29 In 2007, forty-nine-year-old Richard Villarreal
applied for a territory manager position with R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Company (R.J. Reynolds).30 The position guidelines targeted
candidates “[two to three] years out of college,” and more
specifically, sought applicants who “adjust[] easily to changes.”31
The job position’s recruiter was also advised to “‘stay away from’
applicants ‘in sales for [eight to ten] years.’”32 Villarreal applied to
work at R.J. Reynolds six times but was screened out based on the
aforementioned guidelines or rejected each time.33
In May 2010, Villarreal filed a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC, alleging that R.J. Reynolds discriminated against him because
starting salaries of police officers up to the regional average. Id. at 231. Those with less tenure benefited
from the pay adjustments with higher percentage of pay adjustments than the percentage of pay
adjustments for higher tenured police officers. Id. The claimants in the case consisted of officers with
more seniority (i.e., more than five years of service) who also happened to be age forty and over. Id.
26. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012).
27. See Kleber v. CareFusion Corp., 888 F.3d 868, 870 (7th Cir. 2018), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 914
F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding, before vacated en banc, that both employees and applicants may sue
employer or potential employer, respectively, for age discrimination under disparate impact theory);
Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 961 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that applicant
cannot sue potential employer for age discrimination under disparate impact theory); Rabin v.
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (holding that both
employees and applicants may sue an employer or potential employer, respectively, for age
discrimination under disparate impact theory).
28. See Kleber, 888 F.3d at 871; Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 961; Rabin, 236 F. Supp. 3d at1127.
29. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 961.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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of his age.34 After receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter35 in April
2012, Villarreal filed an age discrimination suit against R.J.
Reynolds.36 One count37 of the plaintiff’s complaint alleged disparate
impact under ADEA § 4(a)(2).38
The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s disparate impact claim,
holding that only employees, not job applicants, could pursue a
disparate impact theory of recovery under the ADEA.39 In 2015, a
divided panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
lower court’s decision, ruling as a matter of first impression that
§ 4(a)(2) of the ADEA authorized applicants for employment—not
just employees—to bring disparate impact claims.40 The court’s
decision hinged not on the plain language of the statute, but instead
stemmed from the court’s view that the statute was unclear, and thus
the EEOC’s interpretation was entitled to deference.41 This decision,
34. Id.
35. What You Can Expect After You File a Charge, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/process.cfm [https://perma.cc/6Q6M-PLSB] (last visited Sept. 24,
2019). Generally, before a claimant alleging employment discrimination may sue, the claimant must
first file a charge with the EEOC, allowing the EEOC 180 days to investigate the matter. Id. If the
EEOC is unable to determine that discrimination happened, the agency issues a right-to-sue letter to the
claimant so that a lawsuit may be filed. Id. For violations of the ADEA, a claimant may file suit after the
passage of sixty days from filing the charge with the EEOC, and no right-to-sue letter is required. Id.
36. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 961–62.
37. Id. Although the plaintiff alleged two counts of age discrimination against defendant employer,
disparate treatment and disparate impact, he voluntarily dismissed the disparate treatment claim, only
moving forward on the ADEA disparate impact theory. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 806
F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2015), rev’d en banc, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016).
38. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 961–62.
Villarreal brought a collective action against R.J. Reynolds . . . under the Act on
behalf of “all applicants for the Territory Manager position who applied for the
position since the date R[.]J[.] Reynolds began its pattern or practice of
discriminating against applicants over the age of [forty] . . . ; who were [forty] years
of age or older at the time of their application; and who were rejected for the
position.” The complaint alleged two counts: disparate treatment under [§] 4(a)(1) of
the Act and disparate impact under [§] 4(a)(2) of the Act.
Id.
39. Villarreal, 806 F.3d at 1291.
40. Id. at 1290.
41. Id.
The EEOC’s current ADEA disparate impact regulation, issued under its statutory
rulemaking authority . . . does not distinguish between prospective and existing
employees. Instead, it states that, “[a]ny employment practice that adversely affects
individuals within the protected age group on the basis of older age is discriminatory
unless the practice is justified by a ‘reasonable factor other than age.’”. . The
regulation extends disparate impact liability to all “individuals within the protected
age group.” The EEOC argues that the regulation therefore established the agency’s
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however, was vacated pending a rehearing en banc in early 2016.42
On October 5, 2016, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en
banc, held that job applicants are not entitled to bring disparate
impact claims under § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA because the applicant has
no “status as an employee.”43 Thus, although the Eleventh Circuit
permits job applicants to bring ADEA disparate treatment claims
(i.e., claims of intentional age discrimination),44 those same nonemployee job applicants may not bring ADEA disparate impact
claims.45
B. The Seventh Circuit: Kleber v. CareFusion Corporation
In 2018, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Kleber also heard
a case on this issue: whether the ADEA’s disparate impact provision
protects job applicants in addition to current employees.46 Here, Dale
Kleber, a fifty-eight-year-old attorney with extensive experience
across multiple industries, applied for a senior counsel position with
CareFusion Corporation (CareFusion), a healthcare products
employer.47 Although the employer’s job posting noted a desire for
“a business person’s lawyer” with experience handling “complex
projects,” the employer also included a provision stating that
applicants “must have ‘[three] to [seven] years (no more than [seven]
years) of relevant legal experience.’”48 The fifty-eight-year-old
view that § 4(a)(2) protects any individual an employer discriminates against,
regardless of whether that individual is an employee or job applicant.
Id. at 1299 (citations omitted).
42. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 962 (11th Cir. 2016).
43. Id. at 961.
[Section 4(a)(2) of the Act] makes it “unlawful for an employer . . . to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2). . . .
If the text of the statute is clear, “that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”
Id. at 963 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)).
44. Id. at 970. “Congress did not leave applicants without recourse. Section 4(a)(1) provides them
with a cause of action for disparate treatment.” Id. (citing ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2012)).
45. Id. at 963.
46. Kleber v. CareFusion Corp., 888 F.3d 868, 870 (7th Cir. 2018), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 914 F.3d
480 (7th Cir. 2019).
47. Id. at 871.
48. Id.
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attorney submitted his application but was not selected to interview
because, according to the employer, the role’s years of experience
maximum precluded this applicant’s consideration.49
Kleber filed an age discrimination charge with the EEOC alleging
age discrimination stemming from CareFusion’s decision to exclude
him from consideration because of his years of experience.50 After
CareFusion provided its business rationale for the years of experience
maximum, the EEOC issued Kleber a right-to-sue letter. 51 Kleber
then filed a lawsuit against CareFusion which included a claim of
disparate impact age discrimination under § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA.52
Therein, Kleber specifically alleged that “the maximum experience
cap was ‘based on unfounded stereotypes and assumptions about
older workers, deters older workers from applying for
positions . . . and has a disparate impact on qualified applicants over
the age of [forty].’”53 Relying on precedent, the district court
dismissed the plaintiff’s claim, professing that the ADEA’s disparate
impact provision applies only to employees, not non-employee job
applicants;54 however, on appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed,
holding, unlike the Eleventh Circuit,55 that non-employee job
applicants are protected under the ADEA’s disparate impact
provision.56 Then, less than two months post-ruling, the Seventh
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.

Because of the experience cap, Kleber filed a charge of age discrimination with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. CareFusion responded in a letter to the
EEOC saying its maximum experience cap in the job posting was an “objective
criterion based on the reasonable concern that an individual with many more years of
experience would not be satisfied with less complex duties . . . which could lead to
issues with retention.”
Kleber, 888 F.3d at 871.
52. Id. Plaintiff applicant initially filed an age discrimination suit under both disparate treatment and
disparate impact theories; however, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the disparate treatment claim,
proceeding only with the disparate impact theory. Id. at 871–72.
53. Id. at 871.
54. Id. at 872 (citing Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073
(7th Cir. 1994)).
55. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 961 (11th Cir. 2016).
56. Kleber, 888 F.3d at 888.
Given the statutory language in § 623(a)(2), the interpretation of that language in
Smith and virtually identical language in Griggs, and the absence of any apparent
policy rationale for barring outside job applicants from raising disparate impact
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Circuit vacated the decision, required a rehearing en banc, and
subsequently affirmed the district court’s holding that pursuant to the
plain language of § 4(a)(2), job applicants are not entitled to bring
disparate claims under the ADEA.57
C. A Ninth Circuit District Court: Rabin v.
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
In Rabin, the Northern District of California recently broached the
topic of whether, in addition to employees, job applicants also had
the right to raise disparate impact claims under the ADEA.58 Rabin
filed suit against PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), “alleging that PwC
‘engages in systemic and pervasive discrimination against older job
applicants . . . maintain[ing] hiring policies and practices for giving
preference to younger employees that result in the disproportionate
employment of younger applicants.’”59 Recognizing that neither the
Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court had ruled specifically on this
applicant issue, the court held that the right to file ADEA-related
disparate impact claims attaches to employees and applicants.60
II. Analysis
Although current case law highlights debate as to whether the
ADEA § 4(a)(2) covers non-employee job applicants,61 a literal
reading of the statute, with its varied component parts,62 and a

claims, we are not persuaded by the defendant’s more subtle comparative arguments
using various other statutory provisions.

Id.
57. Kleber v. CareFusion Corp., 914 F.3d 480, 481 (7th Cir. 2019). “In the end, the plain languageof
§ 4(a)(2) leaves room for only one interpretation: Congress authorized only employees to bring disparate
impact claims.” Id. at 485.
58. Rabin v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
59. Id. at 1127.
60. Id. at 1128. “Based on the language of the ADEA, existing precedent, agency interpretations of
the ADEA, and the Act’s legislative history, the Court today concludes that job applicants like
[p]laintiffs may bring disparate impact claims.” Id.
61. See Kleber, 888 F.3d at 871; Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 961 (11th
Cir. 2016); Rabin, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 1127.
62. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)–(d) (2012).
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comparison of the ADEA to close companion legislation, Title VII,63
settles this debate. First, the section of the ADEA giving rise to
disparate impact claims omits the needed reference for non-employee
job applicant protection from employer related actions.64 Next,
language used in other portions of the ADEA expressly includes
applicant language or references to hiring activities.65 This distinction
illustrates that Congress made explicit language choices when
drafting the comprehensive statute. Additionally, when comparing
the ADEA to Title VII, legislation passed five years before the
ADEA and protecting certain innate characteristics other than age,66
the statutes’ different language again demonstrates that Congress
knew the specific words to include when the intent was to reach nonemployee applicants and chose not to include those words in ADEA
§ 4(a)(2). Without congressional action amending ADEA
§ 4(a)(2) to expressly include a group of individuals so clearly
omitted from the current language, judicial inquiry is complete.67
A. Congress Means What It Says and Says What It Means
As noted in Smith, the United States Supreme Court recognizes
disparate impact claims under the ADEA68 through ADEA
§ 4(a)(2).69 That particular section’s ADEA language “focuses on the
effects of the action on the employee rather than the motivation for
the action of the employer,” meaning that the claim analysis is only
one of disparate impact, rather than disparate treatment, where the
63. Glenn & Little, supra note 5.
64. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 554 U.S. 228, 232–33 (2005).
65. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), (b), (c)(1)–(2), (d)(2012).
66. Glenn & Little, supra note 5.
67. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 963 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)).
68. Smith, 554 U.S. at 232.
69. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012).
[N]or the comparable language in the ADEA simply prohibits actions that “limit,
segregate, or classify” persons; rather the language prohibits such actions that
“deprive . . . or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual’s” . . . age[] (explaining that in disparate[]impact cases, “the employer’s
practices may be said to ‘adversely affect [an individual’s status] as an employee’”).
Thus the text focuses on the effects of the action on the employee rather than the
motivation for the action of the employer.
Smith, 554 U.S. at 235–36 (citations omitted).
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result turns on an employer’s intentional discriminatory
motivations.70 So, although Smith affirmatively recognizes the
ADEA’s disparate impact right, the case squarely focuses on
employees, not non-employee job applicants.71 Moreover, ADEA
§ 4(a)(2) does not, specifically or generally, reference applicants or
individuals contemplated for hire.72 Lastly, when comparing the
ADEA’s language in § 4(a)(2) to other portions of the ADEA, it is
clear that when Congress desires the inclusion of applicants or
individuals contemplated for hire, the legislature knows the particular
words to include.73 As it relates to judicial interpretation of statutes,
courts leverage the canons of construction to guide their statutory
interpretation journey.74 However, when a court “find[s] the terms of
a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete . . . .”75 The
ADEA’s applicant language, or lack thereof, tells the judiciary all
that is needed without jumping through secondary or tertiary
statutory interpretation hoops beyond the written words.76
1. The ADEA Text for Applicants to Raise Disparate Impact
Claims Is Missing
The ADEA’s development in 1967 came on the heels of a
Congress-commissioned Secretary of Labor report on age
discrimination.77 This report, the Wirtz Report, involved extensive

70. Smith, 554 U.S. at 236.
71. Id. at 232.
72. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012).
73. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 967 (11th Cir. 2016).
74. Canon of Construction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A rule used in construing
legal instruments, esp[ecially] contracts and statutes; a principle that guides the interpreter of a text.”).
[C]anons of construction are . . . rules of thumb that help courts determine the
meaning of legislation, and in interpreting a statute[,] a court should always turn first
to one, cardinal canon before all others. We have stated time and again that courts
must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute
what it says there When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first
canon is also the last: “judicial inquiry is complete.”
Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S.
424, 430 (1981)).
75. Rubin, 449 U.S. at 430.
76. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2118 (2016).
77. Glenn & Little, supra note 5.
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study regarding the plight of “older workers”78 in America—
specifically, employers’ tendencies to terminate older workers’
employment and employers’ failure to hire workers age forty and
over.79 Given the proximity of the Wirtz Report to the ADEA’s
inception, it would be untenable to argue that applicants were not
considered in the ADEA’s development. The statute’s development
contemplated older applicants in the case of employer practices;80
however, only in ADEA § 4(a)(1), not § 4(a)(2)81—the section that
Smith recognized as providing ADEA’s disparate impact right82—
78. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER
SECTION
715
OF
THE
CIVIL
RIGHTS
ACT
OF
1964
(June
30,
1965)
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/adea50th/wirtz_report.cfm
[https://perma.cc/X3KY-EYCW]
[hereinafter WIRTZ REPORT]. “Older workers” is a term of art used throughout writings about the
ADEA. Glenn & Little, supra note 5, at 41. When the ADEA was originally passed, it provided
protection for older workers, meaning those workers age forty to seventy. Id. Although the lower age
threshold of forty currently remains the starting point of the ADEA’s protection, any reference to an age
cap was removed from the ADEA during its 1986 amendment. Id. Therefore, the ADEA today provides
protection for workers age forty and older. Id.
79. WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 78, at 2–3. One of the WIRTZ REPORT’s findings illustrated the
negative effect that arbitrary job age limits had on older workers. Id. at 6. According to a 1965 U.S.
Department of Labor Bureau of Employment Security survey of hiring practices in five cities, “older
workers represent less than [five] percent of new hires in most establishments.” Id. at 7.
80. Glenn & Little, supra note 5.
Testimony before the Senate General Subcommittee on Labor and Public Welfare in
1967 revealed a number of troubling statistics that helped motivate Congress to take
action. For example, in 1964, applicants over [fifty-five] years of age were barred
from half of all job openings in the private sector. Workers over [forty-five] were
barred from a quarter of these jobs, and workers over [sixty-five] were barred from
almost all of them.
The data presented to Congress also indicated that the problem was worsening
over time—jobs were disappearing, and older workers were bearing the brunt of the
layoffs. Between 1965 and 1966 alone, the share of workers unemployed for [twentyseven] weeks or more that were over age [forty-five] increased from 30.2 percent to
34.3 percent. Older men, it was reported, had been leaving the workforce in droves
since 1951.
Id.
81. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)–(2) (2012). The ADEA’s distinctly different employer practice
sections are as follows:
(a) Employer practices[:] It shall be unlawful for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s age . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
82. Smith v. City of Jackson, 554 U.S. 228, 235–36 (2005).
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does the ADEA reference unlawfulness when employers “fail or
refuse to hire . . . because of such individual’s age.”83
The text of the statute is clear: an employer’s failure-to-hire or
refusal-to-hire actions of non-employee job applicants are only
included in ADEA § 4(a)(1), providing a claim for disparate
treatment.84 ADEA § 4(a)(2), alternatively, provides protection to “an
individual only if he has a ‘status as an employee.’”85 To read nonemployee applicants into § 4(a)(2) requires textual gymnastics that
run counter to the rules of statutory interpretation.86 Courts agree: “If
the text of the statute is clear, ‘that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.’”87 Here, Congress provided clarity in
the statute by adding words to include coverage for non-employee job
applicants in ADEA § 4(a)(1) but declining to use the same nonemployee applicant inclusive language in
§ 4(a)(2)88—the only subpart giving rise to disparate impact claims
under the ADEA.89 Thus, if the statute’s language or lack thereof is
clear, the judicial inquiry is complete.90

83. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2012).
84. Id.
85. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 963 (11th Cir. 2016).
86. See id. at 963–66; see also Kavanaugh, supra note 76, at 2121.
87. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 963 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467
U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)).
88. Id. at 967.
89. Smith v. City of Jackson, 554 U.S. 228, 232 (2005).
90. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 963 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43). “Although employing the
traditional tools of statutory construction may require some effort, that effort does not make a text
ambiguous.” Id. at 970 (citing Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
The American rule of law . . . depends on neutral, impartial judges who say what the
law is, not what the law should be [T]his goal is not merely personal preference
but a constitutional mandate in a separation of powers system. Article I assigns
Congress, along with the President, the power to make laws. Article III grants the
courts the “judicial Power” to interpret those laws in individual “Cases” and
“Controversies.” When courts apply doctrines that allow them to rewrite the laws (in
effect), they are encroaching on the legislature’s Article I power.
Kavanaugh, supra note 76, at 2120 (citations omitted).
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2. Section 4(a)(2)’s Text Differs from Other Parts of the ADEA
In addition to the clear omission of words in ADEA § 4(a)(2)91
that would give disparate impact claim rights to non-employee
applicants, the employment status language giving rise to ADEA
disparate impact claims differs not only from § 4(a)(1) but also from
ADEA subsections 4(b),92 4(c)(2),93 and 4(d).94 In each of these
subsections, the statute provides overt recognition of applicants as
protected from the unlawful practices listed.95 Clearly, Congress
knows how to phrase legislation to include non-employee job
applicants within the statute’s purview.96
ADEA § 4(b) explicitly provides that an employment agency’s97
“fail[ure] or refus[al] to refer for employment . . . any individual
because of . . . age” is unlawful.98 Like § 4(a)(1), this portion of the
91. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012).
92. Id. § 623(b) (“Employment agency practices[:] It shall be unlawful for an employment agency to
fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of
such individual’s age, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of such
individual’s age.”).
93. Id. § 623(c)(2).
(c) It shall be unlawful for a labor organization—
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against,
any individual because of his age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to
refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an
applicant for employment, because of such individual’s age . . . .
Id. § 623(c)(1)–(2) (emphasis added).
94. Id. § 29 U.S.C. § 623(d).
It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or
applicants for employment, for an employment agency to discriminate against any
individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or
applicant for membership, because of such individual, member or applicant for
membership has opposed any practice made unlawful by this section, or because such
individual, member or applicant for membership has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation
under this chapter.
Id. (emphasis added).
95. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(b), (c)(1)–(2), (d).
96. Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992); Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 839 F.3d 958, 966–68 (11th Cir. 2016).
97. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(b). “A business that procures, for a fee, employment for people and
employees for employers. Whether the employer or the employee pays the fee depends on the terms of
the agreement.” Employment Agency, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
98. ADEA, § 29 U.S.C. § 623(b).
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ADEA erases any question about whether non-employee applicants
qualify by specifically outlining age discrimination protection for
workers before employment.99 Additionally, ADEA § 4(d) prohibits
age discrimination by an employer when “any of his employees or
applicants for employment . . . opposed any practice made unlawful
by [the ADEA] . . . or made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
litigation under this chapter.”100 Here, again, a subsection of the same
comprehensive statute overtly includes applicants versus § 4(a)(2)’s
clear omission of applicants and the hiring process.101
Finally, ADEA § 4(c), governing labor organization practices,102 is
crafted to mirror § 4(a), applicable to employers,103 including distinct
subsections giving rise to disparate treatment and disparate impact
claims, respectively.104 However, the two subsections expressly differ
in that § 4(c) references “any individual because of his age” and
actions that “limit such employment opportunities or . . . adversely
affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment,
because of . . . age[,]”105 whereas § 4(a)(2) entirely omits any
reference to applicants for employment.106 Here, again, Congress
chose to include applicant language within another subsection of the
ADEA, § 4(c), without doing the same in a preceding provision,
§ 4(a)(2).107 In citing to Reading Law by Antonin Scalia and Bryan
Garner, Villarreal quotes: “The text must be construed as a
whole.
A word or phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning
throughout a text; a material variation in terms suggests a variation in
99. Id.
100. Id. § 623(d) (emphasis added).
101. Id. § 623(a)(2), (d).
102. Id. § 623(c). “A labor organization is an association of workers who have combined to protect or
promote their interests by bargaining collectively with their employers to secure better working
conditions, wages, and similar benefits.” Labor Organizations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/other-non-profits/labor-organizations [https://perma.cc/E4THT6A8] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019).
103. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a).
104. Smith v. City of Jackson, 554 U.S. 228, 232 (2005); Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604,
609 (1993).
105. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(c) (emphasis added).
106. Id. § 623(a).
107. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 963 (11th Cir. 2016).
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the meaning.”108 As illustrated by ADEA subsections 4(a)(1), 4(b),
4(c), and 4(d), Congress knew how to grant non-employee applicants
ADEA protection; hence, the stark omission of applicant language in
§ 4(a)(2) requires a reading to include only those individuals with
“status as an employee.”109
The 1967 Wirtz Report, noted previously as the impetus for the
ADEA’s creation, studied the plight of older workers, both actively
working and those seeking employment,110 and served as the research
driven legislative foundation for this statutory protection of workers
age forty and older. Leaning on that report, Congress expressly
included the coverage of non-employee job applicants in ADEA
subsections 4(a)(1), 4(b), 4(c)(2), and 4(d).111 However, Congress’s
overt omission of any non-employee job applicant language in
ADEA § 4(a)(2), in contrast to the language choices in those other
subparts of the ADEA112 and the research embedded in the legislative
foundation’s Wirtz Report,113 further solidifies the position that, as
drafted today, § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA does not, nor did Congress
intend for it to, provide a non-employee job applicant disparate
impact right under the ADEA. Yet again, if the statute’s language or
lack thereof is clear, the interpretive role of the judiciary ends.114
B. The ADEA Differs from Title VII
The ADEA is often described as a Title VII offshoot because it
passed just three years after Title VII.115 Although legislative records
indicate that age was debated as a potential protected class when
Title VII was drafted, age did not make the cut in Title VII’s
protections of race, color, sex, religion, and national origin.116
Instead, age received its own unique protections under the ADEA in
108. Id.
109. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2).
110. WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 78, at 7.
111. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), (b), (c)(1)–(2), (d).
112. See id. § 623(a)(1), (b), (c)(1)–(2), (d); Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 963.
113. WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 78, at 7.
114. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 963; Kavanaugh, supra note 76, at 2120.
115. Glenn & Little, supra note 5.
116. Id.
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1967 after completion of the Wirtz Report.117 Although separate
statutes, the courts through the years often interpreted Title VII and
the ADEA similarly.118 For example, the Court in Smith held that
“the ADEA does authorize recovery in ‘disparate[]impact’ cases
comparable to Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,”119 a purely Title VII
challenge. Title VII does recognize disparate impact claims for both
applicants and employees;120 however, the disparate impact right in
Griggs specifically applied to employees, not non-employee
applicants.121
Griggs, a 1971 seminal case, established the disparate impact
theory as cognizable under Title VII.122 This case involved thirteen
African-American employees of a power generation facility claiming
that the requirement of obtaining a high school education or passing
an intelligence test to transfer out of the lowest paying department in
the company had a disparate impact on African-American versus
Caucasian employees.123 Before Title VII’s passage, this defendantemployer had an overt policy of discrimination, precluding AfricanAmerican employees from working in any department except for the
lowest paying labor department.124 To comply with Title VII, the
company introduced a facially neutral policy125 to
117. Smith v. City of Jackson, 554 U.S. 228, 232–33 (2005); WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 78, at 2–3;
Glenn & Little, supra note 5, at 43.
118. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 183 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. Smith, 554 U.S. at 232.
120. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012). Though, today, Title VII
covers both applicants and employees, the Griggs case only contemplated a disparate impact right for
employees, not non-employee applicants, and the case did so before the amendment of Title VII’s
additional coverage for applicants for employment. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d
958, 968 (11th Cir. 2016).
[The] [d]issent contend[s] that the Supreme Court has since described Griggs as a
case about applicants, but they are incorrect. Villarreal quotes language about
applicants and Griggs from Dothard v. Rawlinson, but because the Supreme Court
decided Dothard after Congress added language about applicants to Title VII
(“employees or applicants for employment”), we do not consider this dicta
significant.
Id. (citations omitted).
121. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 968 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971)).
122. Smith, 554 U.S. at 234–35.
123. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425–26.
124. Id. at 426–27.
125. Id. at 427–28. A facially neutral policy or factor means that the charging party must “identify the
‘particular employment practice’ causing” a disproportionate impact on a protected class of people.
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replace its previously overt and intentionally discriminatory racebased policy.126 The Court, however, deemed the new facially neutral
policy to have the effect of “‘freez[ing]’ the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices,” an unlawful disparate impact
on African-Americans under Title VII.127 Although Griggs involved
job qualifications to enter certain employer defined roles, the
plaintiffs there were employees, not non-employee applicants.128
Thus, the connection of the ADEA disparate impact theory
determined in Smith to the comparable Title VII disparate impact
theory found in Griggs only supports the disparate impact theory
recognition for employees.129 This position harmonizes with the prior
statutory language arguments; without express inclusion of nonemployee job applicant language at the time of a court’s statutory
review, the interpretive role of the judiciary ends when it encounters
unambiguous statutory language.130
Although it is true today that either employees or non-employee
applicants may raise Title VII disparate impact claims,131 the rights
of applicants under Title VII developed only after Title VII’s
amendment132 and a subsequent Griggs case, Dothard v. Rawlinson,
leveraging the amended language. 133 The 1977 Dothard case
WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 1, at 457. The employer need not have any discriminatory intent and may
actually have good intentions when designing the policy that is later deemed to have a disproportionate
impact on a legally protected group of individuals. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. “Congress directed the
thrust of the Act [Title VII] to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.”
Id. (emphasis added).
126. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427–28.
127. Id. at 430.
128. Id. at 426.
129. Smith v. City of Jackson, 554 U.S. 228, 235–36 (2005); Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
839 F.3d 958, 968 (11th Cir. 2016).
130. Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981).
131. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012).
132. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 109 (1972). In 1972, Congress
amended numerous provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including an amendment
adding applicants to the statute’s protections. Id. This amendment adding applicants for employment to
the already covered employees in the statute’s purview took place after the Griggs case—involving only
employees of the defendant-employer—was decided in 1971. See generally Griggs, 401 U.S. 424.
133. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329–32 (1977). “After her application was rejected,
[plaintiff] brought this class suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. V) ” Id. at 323 (emphasis added). In
Dothard, Dianne Rawlinson applied to work in an Alabama corrections prison as a “correctional
counselor.” Id. The position applied for required that each applicant weigh at least 120 pounds and be

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss2/3

18

Woodward: Disparate Impact Under the ADEA: Applicants Need not Apply

2020]

DISPARATE IMPACT

369

recognized a non-employee job applicant’s right under Title VII to
bring a claim for discrimination under a theory of disparate impact
but grounded the decision in Title VII’s amended language of
“employees or applicants for employment.”134 This case did not
overrule Griggs or extend Griggs to include applicants.135
Even with this case law illustrating that Griggs granted an
employee disparate impact right under Title VII136 while the same
Title VII disparate impact right for non-employee applicants did not
arise until Dothard—a case decided after Title VII’s amendment
adding a reference to applicants—137 some still argue that the ADEA
provisions “were derived in haec verba138 from Title VII.”139 Those
proponents, therefore, argue that the two distinctly different statutes
should be interpreted equally as it relates to the unique protected
classes named in the statutes.140 The 2009 five to four Gross v. FBL
Financial Services decision debunked the myth that Title VII and the
ADEA must track together for interpretation.141
In Gross, a fifty-four-year-old, long-tenured employee of FBL
Financial Services sued his employer under the ADEA for
reassigning him from his position of claims administration director to
five feet two inches tall. Id. at 323–24. Rawlinson did not meet the weight requirement, and her
application was rejected for that reason. Id. at 324. Rawlinson argued that the minimum weight
requirement violated federal law on the basis of sex, and after filing an EEOC charge and receiving a
right-to-sue letter, Rawlinson filed suit “on behalf of herself and other similarly situated women,
challenging the statutory height and weight minima as violative of Title VII “ Id. at 323–24.
134. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 968 (11th Cir. 2016) (emphasisadded).
135. Id. at 963; see generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
136. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 328; Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 968. “In enacting Title VII, Congress required
‘the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate
invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.’” Dothard, 433
U.S. at 328 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431).
137. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 109 (1972); Dothard, 433 U.S. at
323.
138. In Haec Verba, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The phrase in haec verba is Latin
for “[i]n these same words; verbatim.” Id.
139. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 183 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)).
140. Id. at 183 (Stevens, J., dissenting). “[W]e have long recognized that our interpretations of Title
VII’s language apply ‘with equal force in the context of age discrimination, for the substantive
provisions of the ADEA ’” Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985)).
141. Id. at 174.
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claims project coordinator.142 Gross argued “that his reassignment
was based at least in part on his age” even if other reasons for the
employment action existed.143 The plaintiff here relied on the
motivating factor framework applicable to Title VII intentional
discrimination claims; however, the Court ruled that this motivating
factor framework did not apply to claims under the ADEA.144
Congress amended Title VII in 1991, adding this motivating factor
causation framework, but did not amend the ADEA to add this
provision.145 “When Congress amends one statutory provision but not
another, it is presumed to have acted intentionally.”146 For an ADEA
aggrieved plaintiff to prevail, he or she must prove that their age was
the “but-for” cause of the undesired employment action, not merely
one of the motivating factors.147 By holding that the mixed-motive
instruction endorsed under Title VII does not apply under the
ADEA,148 the Court made it clear that Title VII and the ADEA are
two distinct statutory animals.149
It follows that if Congress’s intention was to include applicants in
the recognized disparate impact provision of the ADEA, it would
have done so. Neither Title VII nor the ADEA has been free from
amendment since their respective passages in 1964 and 1967;150
142. Id. at 170.
143. Id.
144. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 173 (2009).
145. Id. at 174.
146. Id. (citing Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256
(1991)).
147. Id. at 176.
148. Id. at 170, 173.
149. Id. at 173.
When conducting statutory interpretation, we “must be careful not to apply rules
applicable under one statute to a different statute without careful and critical
examination.” Unlike Title VII, the ADEA’s text does not provide that a plaintiff may
establish discrimination by showing that age was simply a motivating factor.
Moreover, Congress neglected to add such a provision to the ADEA when it amended
Title VII to add §§ 2000e–2(m) and §§ 2000e–5(g)(2)(B), even though it
contemporaneously amended the ADEA in several ways . . . .
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009) (quoting Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552
U.S. 389, 393 (2008)) (citation omitted).
150. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255 (1964), amended by Pub. L.
No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 109 (1972), amended by Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074–76 (1991); VICTORIA
A. LIPNIC, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, THE STATE OF AGE DISCRIMINATION AND
OLDER WORKERS IN THE U.S. 50 YEARS AFTER THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
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however, even with the ADEA’s amendments, the word “applicant”
or the idea of “hiring activities” have not been added to § 4(a)(2), the
section giving rise to disparate impact claims.151 “Statutory
construction must begin with the language employed by Congress
and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language
accurately expresses the legislative purpose.”152 If the statute’s
language or lack thereof is clear, the judicial inquiry is complete.153
III. Proposal
To settle the debate on whether non-employee job applicants may
bring disparate impact claims under the ADEA, the Supreme Court
must grant certiorari in a future case to resolve the varied views and
interpretations of federal courts on this issue.154 The role for the
Court then is quite simple—read and hold to the plain language of
ADEA § 4(a)(2) that provides no reference to applicants or
individuals contemplated for hire.155 This proposal runs counter to
the argument that the ADEA is a broad-brush piece of legislation
providing protection for all individuals, whether currently working or
seeking work, age forty and over.156
If Congress’s current desire is to protect both employees and nonemployee job applicants, then a simple amendment to § 4(a)(2)
adding an explicit reference to applicants for employment, like Title
VII’s 1972 amendment, is all that would be needed.157 However, as
uncomplicated as this language addition might be, the congressional
exercise would likely be futile in practice based on the defenses
available for both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims in
(ADEA) 9–10 (2018).
151. Smith v. City of Jackson, 554 U.S. 228, 232–33 (2005).
152. Gross, 557 U.S. at 175 (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541
U.S. 246, 252 (2004)).
153. Kavanaugh, supra note 76, at 2120.
154. See Kleber v. CareFusion Corp., 914 F.3d 480, 481 (7th Cir. 2019); Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 961 (11th Cir. 2016); Rabin v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 236 F. Supp.
3d 1126, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
155. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012).
156. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (2007); Glenn & Little, supra note 5.
157. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 109 (1972).
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§ 4(f)(1).158 Particularly for disparate impact claims, Smith notes that
“[u]nlike Title VII . . . § 4(f)(1) of the ADEA . . . contains language
that significantly narrows its coverage by permitting any ‘otherwise
prohibited’ action ‘where the differentiation is based on reasonable
factors other than age’ . . . . ”159 Hence, even if non-employee job
applicants were added to the ADEA’s disparate impact provision, the
desired effect, supporting older workers in their quest for gainful
employment,160 is unlikely because the additional language would
produce little, if any, real change.
A. The Reasonable Factor Other Than Age Defense
Although the ADEA prohibits intentional
age-based
discriminatory practices and facially neutral practices that have a
disparate impact on older workers, the statute includes affirmative
defenses for both of these otherwise unlawful practices.161 ADEA
§ 4(f) reads:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer . . . to take any
action otherwise prohibited under subsection (a), (b), (c), or
(e) of [the ADEA] where age is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of the particular business, or where the differentiation is
based on reasonable factors other than age 162
The bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) is an affirmative
defense arising under Title VII and the ADEA for disparate treatment
cases.163 Applied in Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, an ADEA
disparate treatment case, an employer claiming a BFOQ defense must
prove both that the facially discriminatory classification is reasonably
158. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).
159. Smith v. City of Jackson, 554 U.S. 228, 233 (2005).
160. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2; Glenn & Little, supra note 5.
161. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)–(2), (f)(1); Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84,
91 (2008).
162. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (emphasis added).
163. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e), (k)
(2012).
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necessary to the essence of the employer’s business and that the
employer must be compelled to rely on the facial classification as a
proxy for the reason validated in the first part of the test.164 The Court
in Western Air Lines noted that the BFOQ standard is one of
“reasonable necessity,” not merely reasonableness.165 However, in
Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, the Court recognized
that the ADEA’s BFOQ defense only “establishes an affirmative
defense against claims of disparate treatment,” whereas the
appropriate affirmative defense against an ADEA claim of disparate
impact is reasonable factors other than age (RFOA).166
In contrast to the BFOQ’s strict application of reasonable
necessity, the RFOA defense only requires that the facially neutral
“factor relied upon was a ‘reasonable’ one for the employer to be
using . . . . [A] reasonable factor may lean more heavily on older
workers . . . .”167 With this statutorily defined defense squarely
outlined by Congress in the ADEA, the likelihood of an employer not
having at least one reasonable business factor for a facially neutral
employment policy is improbable. Especially as it relates to
applicants and years-of-experience targets, employers have a myriad
of reasons—employee retention; the role’s value to the organization
and in the competitive job market; and the establishment of a culture
of growth, development, and promotion from within—they might cite
for the practice.168 An applicant-plaintiff would be hard-pressed to
argue that those factors do not represent reasonable business factors
and hence, the non-employee applicant-plaintiff would find his
disparate impact claim dead on arrival.

164. W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 416–17, 419, 422–23 (1985).
165. Id. at 419.
166. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 92, 96 (2008).
167. Id. at 96.
168. Mike Kappel, How Your Business Benefits when You Hire Millennials, FORBES (Sept. 3, 2016,
4:13 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikekappel/2016/09/03/how-your-business-benefits-whenhiring-millennials/#5d00636127a0 [https://perma.cc/N7TE-RLAC]; Pini Yakuel, Why Promoting from
COMMS.
COUNCIL
(June
20,
2018,
8:00
AM),
Within Works,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbescommunicationscouncil/2018/06/20/why-promoting-from-withinworks/#31b9b2ed2231 [https://perma.cc/9JM3-AS8H].
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B. EEOC Only Seeking a Legitimate Business Purpose
For those who argue ADEA § 4(a)(2) disparate impact provision
applies to non-employee job applicants despite the statute’s plain
language reference only to employees, their premise is that the
language in this portion of the ADEA is ambiguous.169 Once a court
defines language as ambiguous, the court then moves to the next step
in the statutory interpretation chain—deference to the statute’s
enforcement agency.170 For the ADEA, the EEOC is that
enforcement agency.171 Although the EEOC views the ADEA
disparate impact provision as reaching both employees and nonemployee job applicants,172 the enforcement agency also recognizes
the limited applicability of ADEA disparate impact claims resulting
from the RFOA affirmative defense.173
Following the rulings in Smith and Meacham and a lengthy EEOC
notice of rulemaking comment period,174 the EEOC, in March 2012,
issued its final rule concerning disparate impact and reasonable
factors other than age.175 Here, the EEOC’s rule clarified that the
appropriate defense for ADEA disparate impact claims was RFOA
rather than business necessity and explained the meaning of the
RFOA defense.176 The EEOC describes an employment practice as
being “based on an RFOA when it was reasonably designed and
169. See Kleber v. CareFusion Corp., 888 F.3d 868, 877 (7th Cir. 2018), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 914
F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2019); Rabin v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1128, 1132
(N.D. Cal. 2017).
170. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
171. About EEOC, supra note 19.
172. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (2007); Glenn & Little, supra note 5.
173. Questions and Answers on EEOC Final Rule on Disparate Impact and “Reasonable Factors
Other Than Age” Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 at No. 7, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
COMMISSION,
OPPORTUNITY
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/adea_rfoa_qa_final_rule.cfm#_ftnref1 [https://perma.cc/48KM7HEA] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019) [hereinafter Questions and Answers].
174. Disparate Impact and Reasonable Factors Other Than Age Under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 19080, 19080 (Mar. 30, 2012) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1625). As
the agency responsible for implementing workplace discrimination laws, like the ADEA, the EEOC
issues regulations to carry out this responsibility. EEOC Regulations, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM., https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/JRE7-DUYX] (last visited
Sept. 25, 2019).
175. Disparate Impact and Reasonable Factors Other Than Age Under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, supra note 174, at 19080.
176. Questions and Answers, supra note 173, at No. 3.
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administered to achieve a legitimate business purpose in light of the
circumstances, including its potential harm to older workers.”177 The
EEOC provides a non-exhaustive list of considerations relevant to
this reasonableness assessment, including components like the
employer’s stated business purpose, the employer’s fair and accurate
application of the defined factor, the degree of harm to individuals
within the protected age group, and any steps taken to reduce the
harm.178 Clear in the EEOC guidance, a successful RFOA defense
does not require an employer to meet all of these considerations;
moreover, the employer may still assert a successful RFOA defense
without meeting any of these listed considerations.179 This defense’s
practical results are that time and again, plaintiffs, after identifying a
specific employment practice ripe for an ADEA disparate impact
claim,180 will find themselves on the losing end of such claim with an
employer citing one of many business reasons for these facially
neutral practices (e.g., market pay increases,181 targeted years of
experience,182 focused recruiting on college campuses, or specific
technology skills) that disparately impact older workers.
C. Provide Employers the Knowledge and Incentive to Thrive
with Older Workers
Employers, especially in today’s exceedingly difficult labor
market, are searching for the holy grail of talent recruiting and
retention;183 yet, those same employers find themselves frustrated
177. Id. at No. 8 (emphasis added).
178. Id.
179. Id. at No. 9.
180. Id. at No. 6.
181. Smith v. City of Jackson, 554 U.S. 228, 231 (2005).
182. Kleber v. CareFusion Corp., 888 F.3d 868, 877 (7th Cir. 2018), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 914 F.3d
480 (7th Cir. 2019); Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 961 (11th Cir. 2016).
183. Workforce 2020: The Looming Talent Crisis, OXFORD ECON.,
https://www.oxfordeconomics.com/recent-releases/workforce-2020-the-looming-talent-crisis
[https://perma.cc/VVS3-6VWS] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019). The unemployment rate in September
2018 settled at 3.7%, a low number, the likes of which the United States has not experienced in almost
fifty years and a rate that is expected to remain below four percent through the year 2021. Eric Morath
& Harriet Torry, U.S. Unemployment Rate Falls to Lowest Level Since 1969, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 5,
2018, 4:44 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-unemployment-rate-falls-to-lowest-level-since-19691538742766 [https://perma.cc/FCP8-LMN2]; see Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population
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when navigating a complicated web of often ineffective regulation.184
Instead of clogging courts with non-fruitful ADEA disparate impact
arguments by older job applicants where employers can typically
provide one of many legitimate purposes for facially neutral
employment practices, the more appropriate response would be using
the EEOC’s voice and power to influence employers to hire older
workers by educating and incentivizing employers on the benefits of
such action. To further positive movement, congressional and EEOC
action should focus on creating incentives for employers to hire older
workers, those most susceptible to unconscious biases and
stereotypes, and developing programs that increase older workers’
relevance in the workplace.
The concept of incentivizing employers to hire difficult to employ
individuals instead of using a regulatory stick to drive action is not an
untested idea. For example, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit
(WOTC) program, created in 1996 and renewed eleven times since
its inception, provides a federal tax credit to employers for hiring
individuals in targeted and underserved groups.185 Although WOTC
program research is limited, a Government Accountability Office
research study “concluded that ‘the tax subsidy was by far the factor
motivating employers to hire WOTC eligible workers.’”186
Additionally, Peter Cappelli, a Wharton School professor, analyzed
Survey, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000
[https://perma.cc/JL56-2KCA] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019).
184. See generally Kent Hoover, [Ten] Regulations that Give Small Business Owners the Worst
BUS.
JOURNALS
(Apr.
28,
2016,
1:38
PM),
Headaches,
THE
https://www.bizjournals.com/bizjournals/washingtonbureau/2016/04/10-regulations-that-give-smallbusiness-owners-the.html?s=print [https://perma.cc/3XYU-3BF7]; Ilyse Schuman, Michael J. Lotito &
Betsy Cammarata, Ready or Not, Here it Comes! 2018 Brings New Labor & Employment Laws,
MENDELSON
P.C. (Nov.
13,
2017),
Primarily
at
the
State
Level,
LITTLER
https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/ready-or-not-here-it-comes-2018-brings-newlabor-employment-laws [https://perma.cc/6PNN-6MWU].
185. Work Opportunity Tax Credit, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/smallbusinesses-self-employed/work-opportunity-tax-credit [https://perma.cc/9LRZ-GQXJ] (last visited Sept.
25, 2019). The WOTC program provides tax credits to employers that hire individuals from targeted
groups like supplemental nutrition assistance program recipients, veterans, and supplemental security
income recipients. Id. Once an employer acquires certification that an individual hired is a member of a
targeted group, the employer then takes a tax credit to offset a portion of the business’s income tax
liability. Id.
186. Katherine English, Conflicting Approaches to Addressing Ex-Offender Unemployment: The
Work Opportunity Tax Credit and Ban the Box, 93 IND. L.J. 513, 522 (2018).
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the WOTC program through limited, program-specific research and a
comparison to a broad range of other well-researched employment
subsidy programs and determined the WOTC program was costeffective for society.187 Not only does society benefit from these nowemployed workers being less dependent on governmental programs,
like welfare, employers benefit from the coveted tax credit with an
estimated “three-quarters of employers chang[ing] their employment
practices in some way to accommodate WOTC recipients[] and half
chang[ing] training practices.”188
The EEOC recognizes improvement in blatant or intentional
discrimination since the ADEA’s 1967 passage; however, the agency
notes that today’s age discrimination often stems from age-based
stereotypes and unconscious biases rather than intentional
discriminatory actions.189 In a survey conducted in 2017, “[six] out of
[ten] older workers have seen or experienced age discrimination in
the workplace[,] and [ninety] percent of those say it is common.”190
These high rates of perceived age discrimination, however, resulted
in only three percent of these older workers’ discriminatory
experiences being reported as formal complaints either in the
workplace or to a regulatory agency like the EEOC.191 The statistics
clearly demonstrate that regulation alone cannot and has not solved
this pervasive issue. Instead, employers must be educated and
incentivized to drive real improvement for older workers, debunking
myths plaguing the aging workforce.192
Stereotypes about older workers are that they cost more than
younger workers for the same job, have an increased absence rate due
to illness, do not exhibit the same mental agility that younger workers
187. Id. at 522, 524; Peter Cappelli, Assessing the Effect of the Work Opportunity Tax Credit, ADP,
LLC, https://www.adp.com/~/media/Reference%20PDFs/Cappelli_Study_2011.ashx
[https://perma.cc/4VZD-X74N] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019).
188. English, supra note 186, at 522.
189. LIPNIC, supra note 150, at 22–23.
190. Id. at 4.
191. Id. at 28.
192. The
Myths
of
Older
Workers
Need
to
be
Debunked,
RANDSTAD,
https://www.randstad.com/press/news/randstad-news/the-myths-of-older-workers-need-to-be-debunked/
[https://perma.cc/N9GQ-YAZC] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019).
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might, and are less productive and relevant in the workplace.193
Alternatively, some cutting-edge employers are refusing to fall prey
to these stereotypes and are instead leveraging older workers to shore
up the skills shortages faced in America.194 These employers
recognize the strengths of experienced workers, citing the older
workers’ good judgment, unvarnished insight, ability to parse the
clutter from what truly matters in a particular situation, emotional
intelligence exhibited through keen listening and a strong sense of
self, and holistic thinking.195
As noted by the 1973 Senate Special Committee on Aging, the
“ADEA was enacted, not only to enforce the law, but to provide the
facts that would help change attitudes.”196 Those facts, with the
power to nullify some of the long-term biases against aging workers,
exist. For example, with a focus on market-based competitive wage
benchmarking by job,197 older workers do not always cost more than
younger workers for the same market-priced job. Additionally, the
return on investment in an older worker may be higher with
millennials changing jobs about every three years versus older
workers seeking stability and delivering longer tenures.198 This
increased retention decreases turnover costs and stems the loss of
employer-specific knowledge.199 Finally, “[a]ge is positively
correlated with employee engagement, as workers age [fifty] and
older have the highest levels of engagement in the
193. Id.; Eric Titner, Workplace Tips: Avoiding Age Discrimination on the Job, USA TODAY (Jan.
23,
2018,
9:02
AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/careers/professionaldevelopment/2018/01/23/avoiding-age-discrimination-on-the-job/109569042/ [https://perma.cc/9XCFZFMZ].
194. Eben Harrell, The Solution to the Skills Gap Could Already Be Inside Your Company, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Sept. 27, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/09/the-solution-to-the-skills-gap-could-already-beinside-your-company [https://perma.cc/A8EE-U7M6]; Pavel Krapivin, How Organizations Are
Harnessing the Wisdom of Baby Boomers to Combat Skills Shortages, FORBES (Sept. 24, 2018, 3:21
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/pavelkrapivin/2018/09/24/how-airbnb-got-wiser-with-the-help-of-amodern-elder/ [https://perma.cc/5LX2-9B86].
195. Krapivin, supra note 194.
196. LIPNIC, supra note 150, at 3.
197. Building a Market-Based Pay Structure from Scratch, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT. (Jan. 12,
2018),
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/toolkits/pages/buildingamarketbasedpaystructurefromscratch.aspx.
198. LIPNIC, supra note 150, at 43.
199. Id. at 44.
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workplace. . . . [H]igh employee engagement increases employee
productivity.”200
For unconscious biases to dissipate, especially in the hiring realm,
and for employers to reap the rewards of older workers, companies
must proactively work to change their facially neutral but nonetheless
age-limiting practices. Small changes in hiring processes could result
in significant changes for older applicants. For example, employers
removing years-of-experience maximums from job postings and
delivering web content and graphics that depict the multigenerational workforce they seek201 would open the labor pool to
individuals often excluded before even entering the interview
process.202 Additionally, employers’ creation of age-diverse
interview teams has the potential to reduce or eliminate the tendency
for interviewers to gravitate toward hiring someone like
themselves.203 “Age discrimination is legally wrong and has been
since the ADEA took effect five decades ago[,] [b]ut it remains too
common and too accepted in today’s workplace.”204 Additional
punitive regulation is not the answer; employer education and
incentives are.
CONCLUSION
Fifty years since its passage, courts are still interpreting the
ADEA’s language, specifically as it relates to a non-employee job
applicant’s right to claim disparate impact from an employer’s
facially neutral employment practice.205 Despite clear statutory
language,206 opponents who believe the disparate impact theory of
recovery should be available to job applicants argue ambiguity, and
200. Id.
201. Id. at 43.
202. Kleber v. CareFusion Corp., 888 F.3d 868, 877 (7th Cir. 2018), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 914 F.3d
480 (7th Cir. 2019).
203. LIPNIC, supra note 150, at 43–44.
204. Id. at 40.
205. See Kleber, 914 F.3d at 481; Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 961 (11th
Cir. 2016); Rabin v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
206. See generally Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 963 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)).
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therefore, deference to the EEOC’s position on the matter.207 The
EEOC, ignoring the plain language of the statute, recognizes this
disparate impact right as arising for non-employee job applicants;208
however, in practice, this right provides little, if any, relief to older
workers attempting to acquire gainful employment. Instead of
continuing to waive the ADEA enforcement stick at disparate impact
claims, a stick that packs little punch due to an employer’s
recognized RFOA affirmative defense,209 Congress and the EEOC
must leverage their voices and subsequent action to educate and
incentivize employers, shucking the negative myths associated with
older workers and embracing the benefits workplace age diversity
produces.

207. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (2007).
208. Id.
209. Questions and Answers, supra note 173, at No. 8.
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